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INTRODUCTION

When I was in my early twenties, a friend and I volunteered to drive a
handicapped person to and from art therapy sessions. This person, formerly
a vibrant young man on the verge of a professional career, had sustained
severe brain damage in an automobile accident. As a result, he could not
walk, he intermittently drooled, and his speech was unintelligible. Unfortunately, he was sufficiently self-aware to understand the permanency of his
condition. He also knew of the overwhelming burden faced by his parents
in caring for him. In light of these tragic circumstances, we offered to
transport him to therapy on a weekly basis. Although it was apparent that
continued therapy was futile, we felt we were contributing in some small way
to his rehabilitation.
Our enthusiasm for the undertaking quickly faded. On numerous
occasions, this person attempted to undo his seat belt and open the car door
while the car was underway. His actions clearly illustrated his desire to take
his life. Only repeated intervention by my friend and me prevented our
charge from pitching himself from the moving vehicle. In retrospect, I often

* This note received the Barbara W. Makar Writing Award as the outstanding note for
the Fall 1994 semester.
** The author would like to express his gratitude to Professor Robert C.L. Moffat, whose
insights inspired much of the substance of this note.
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wonder whether we served his interests by restraining him Providing the
instrumentality of his death, however, was far beyond the scope of the
responsibilities we had accepted.
The situation just described deeply affected my view of assisted suicide.
Many commentators, even those who support euthanasia, feel the practice
should be limited to patients who are nearing death and suffering great pain.
In this note, I contend that euthanasia should be made available to anyone
who, after sufficient reflection, determines that the rigors of physical
existence have made life more tortuous than pleasurable.2 Hence, this
proposal would extend the option of euthanasia to more patients than some
comparable approaches.
Nevertheless, unlike some euthanasia proponents, I do not conceive of
the right to die as absolute.' Several strict limitations should be applied.
My approach is restricted to rational persons who voluntarily choose
euthanasia.' Also, to obtain relief under this proposal, these patients would
have to be suffering from a terminal illness or incapacitating physical
condition. These guidelines are supported by both individual and societal
axioms. They are based upon an elegant view of human existence, a view
that considers both the nature of humanity and it's relation to society.
Apart from the loose framework suggested above, this note does not
articulate any specific plan for implementation of euthanasia. It focuses
instead on broad policy issues and philosophic underpinnings. Before
moving into the core of the euthanasia debate, this note discusses suicide and
provides an overview of how the law regulates voluntary attempts to die.
The central part of this note reveals several key justifications for euthanasia.

1. Today, more than 10 years after these incidents took place, the individual's condition
remains unchanged.
2. See Eugenie Anne Gifford, Artes Moriendi: Active Euthanasiaand the Art of Dying,
40 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1545, 1566 (examining the propriety of limiting the availability of
euthanasia to patients with less than six months to live). "[S]uch an arbitrary time period
seems to reflect an assumption that the decision whether to permit euthanasia turns not on
whether life in its present form is worth living, but on precisely how much life might be left."
Id. (emphasis added).
3. ROBERT N. WENNBERG, TERMINAL CHOICES: EUTHANASIA, SUICIDE AND THE RIGHT

TO DIE 194-95 (1989). "Current euthanasia proposals typically make provisions only for the
terminally ill. .. . Of course [advocacy for extending the right to the incurable but nonterminal] ... if premature, might jeopardize the push to legalize euthanasia for the terminally
ill .... " Id. This observation, while perhaps accurate, does not reflect the view in this note.
I think it better to reveal the entire scope of what is sought.
4. I hesitate to refer to assisted suicide as a right because the term is subject to serious
abuse. Justice Holmes once noted, "All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their
logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy ..
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
5. Reduced cognitive abilities do not always preclude rational decisionmaking. Line
drawing in such cases is a complex ethical issue.
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It analyzes euthanasia from two standpoints. It first looks at euthanasia from
an individual perspective. It then reviews euthanasia from a broader societal
perspective. Finally, this note presents an array of arguments against
euthanasia, refuting each of them in turn.
II.

SOCIAL AND LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF SUICIDE

Suicide, assisted or solitary, presents profound and irreversible social
implications. At the outset, it is important to realize that this note does not
endorse suicide as a way of avoiding life's ordinary difficulties. Such suicide
is irrational. In its least offensive form, it may be a way of escaping grief
or obligation. In its most grotesque form, suicide can become a means of
revenge, a way of hitting back at those perceived as responsible for the
suicidal person's ills. Reflecting upon the devastating impact of vengeful
suicide on loved ones and dependents, it is evident that the act of taking
one's life can be a cowardly and selfish gesture.
Nevertheless, under certain circumstances suicide is neither spiteful nor
irrational.6 Patients suffering the painful effects of a terminal illness and
persons trapped in severely handicapped bodies may have valid reasons for
contemplating suicide. Certainly, death in such instances is not always
desired by the handicapped individual. Many seriously disabled persons find
life highly rewarding and make tremendous contributions to society. Many
terminally ill patients elect to endure considerable pain to spend the final
remnants of life with friends and family. The individual's wishes in such
cases should be honored.
Not everyone shares these preferences, however. Some patients abhor the
idea of subjecting themselves to a painful existence or express horror at the
prospect of a life of dependency and immobility. Yet, once they have
determined that death is the preferred option, these individuals often find they
lack the physical capacity to end their lives. This note addresses the plight
of persons trapped in this situation.
What then is the current posture of the law towards euthanasia? The
answer depends largely upon the physical and mental state of the individual
seeking death. Let us first consider unassisted suicide. Interestingly, neither
suicide nor attempted suicide are prohibited in any state.7 While state

6. Karl Binding, Permittingthe Destructionof Unworthy Life, 8 ISSUES L. & MED. 231,
234 (1992). "In addition to acts of self-killing which can sink to the lowest grade of
frivolous vulgarity and cowardice, there are examples of altruistic suicide by psychologically
healthy people, who stand on the highest moral level." Id.
7. Id. at 233 ("The law, which is powerless to make the strength of individuals
proportionate to the burdens laid upon them by life, expresses this idea distinctly by
recognizing everyone's freedom to end his own life."); Thomas J. Marzen, Suicide: A
Constitutional Right, 24 DUQ. L. REv. 1, 85 (1985); Robert Risley, Voluntary Active
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governments may furnish counseling to those who express suicidal urges,
preventative measures generally stop short of confinement. Consequently,
persons physically capable of killing themselves may attempt to do so
without legal consequence.
Additionally, the law in all states grants patients the right to refuse
medical treatment.'
This refusal is sometimes referred to as passive
euthanasia. At the patient's request, a doctor can switch off a heart-lung
machine or other life-sustaining equipment.9 Not only can patients refuse
medication and treatment, but they also can decline nutrition and water.
Hence, when looked at superficially, the law might appear to confer
substantial power upon patients who seek to avoid treatment. When
examined more closely, however, this prerogative becomes somewhat less
palatable. Patients physically unable to commit suicide face a difficult choice
in passive euthanasia. They can choose to die of thirst, starvation, or the
ravages of disease."°
Perhaps surprisingly, the legal system exhibits even less clemency toward
those who aid in suicide. While holding people criminally responsible for
furthering a noncriminal act may seem untenable, the law in most states
strictly prohibits assisting suicide." Euthanasia opponents insist that this

Euthanasia: The Next Frontier,Impact on the Indigent, 8 IssuEs L. & MED. 361, 365 (1992).
8. Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right to Die: The Wrongful Living
Cause of Action, 75 GEo. L.J. 625, 630 (1986). "Inherent in the recognition of the right to
die is the concept of consent, or more particularly, 'informed consent.' If the person asserting
the right is legally competent, he or she could withhold consent to undertake medical treatment." Id.
9. Gifford, supra note 2, at 1551. "[N]o physician in the United States has been
convicted of homicide for employing passive euthanasia techniques in a hopeless case." Id.
10. Robert C.L. Moffat, Liberty, Equality, Eternity: The Case for Assisted Suicide 1
(1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
[Hospice workers] will be able to tell you how many days it will take you to die
without water, how many days it will take you to die without nutrition. The doctors
will also tell you that going without hydration is rather uncomfortable. So they
suggest just cutting off nutrition. That will take somewhere in the vicinity of 17
days. Clearly that is not exactly quick and easy.
Id.
11. Cf.Binding, supra note 6, at 236-37 (examining the inconsistency between allowing
suicide but preventing assisted suicide).
If one insists on recognizing the legality of suicide, then it follows:
(a) that no one can have a right to prevent the suicide in his lawful act;
(b) that the suicide has a right to self-defense in the face of any attempt to
stop the act;
(c) that (if one regards the right of persons to kill themselves as transferable)
all so-called accomplices who act with the suicide 's express consent ...are also
acting legally... [;]
(d) that killing a patently consenting person must be considered a legally
permitted killing.
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inconsistency is necessary in order to prevent murderers from masquerading
as euthanasia practitioners. 2 It is true that under the present regime there
can be no confusion since motive makes little difference. 3
The impact of this proscription is that the government forbids doctors and
family members from affirmatively hastening death."' If doctors or family
members respond to pleas for active assistance, they may find themselves
facing manslaughter or murder charges. 5 In other words, while the law
tolerates passive euthanasia, it condemns active euthanasia.' 6 Nevertheless,
there are reasons, both philosophical and practical, for reconsidering the
propriety of this ban on active euthanasia.
III.

INDIVIDUALIST RATIONALES FOR EUTHANASIA

When evaluating individualist theories favoring legalization of euthanasia,
the relative importance of individual freedom is pivotal. If accorded enough
weight, concern for liberty could trump any perceived drawbacks to
euthanasia. However, ranking liberty as more important than other human
needs is not the scheme adopted here. Lexical ordering of rights generally
results in the depiction of certain rights as absolute. Unrestricted rights, in
turn, give vent to individual whims while devaluing responsibility and
societal bonds. Furthermore, granting primacy to any one right rejects both
contextual and qualitative analysis. Because liberty is such a complex theme,

Id.
12. But see LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 65-70 (Yale Univ. Rev. ed. 1969)
(listing the avoidance of contradictory laws as one of the eight principles of legality).
13. Of course, motive does affect some outcomes. Jury nullification, light sentences, and
failure to prosecute are factors that tend to let suicide assistants off-the-hook in many cases.
However, I am discussing the law as it stands on the books.
14. This prohibition is unrealistic in its expectations. It forces persons into a catch-22
situation, wherein they are forbidden to respond to the desperate pleas of loved ones. Yet, in
many cases, helping loved ones end their suffering may seem the only moral course of action.
Professor Fuller attacked the morality of any law requiring the impossible. FULLER, supra
note 12, at 70-79. "We come now to the most serious infringement of the principle that the
law should not command the impossible. This lies in laws creating a strict criminal liability
- laws under which a man may be found guilty of a crime though he acted with due care and
with an innocent intent." Id. at 77.
15. David R. Schanker, Note, OfSuicide Machines, EuthanasiaLegislation and the Health
Care Crisis, 68 IND. L. REv. 977, 989. Dr. Jack Kevorkian was charged with first degree
murder after assisting in the 1990 suicide of Janet Adkins, an Alzheimer's patient. Id.
16. Id. at 984.
The active/passive distinction is closely related to the categorical differences of acts
of commission and omission, of withholding and withdrawing treatment, and of the
direct and indirect causation of death. .... [T]he active/passive distinction is the
prevailing legal boundary which physicians must observe with respect to their
patients' right to die.
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this note employs a bifurcated inquiry. It considers individual freedom under
two separate prongs: autonomy and toleration.
A.

Developing a Theory of Autonomy

Rights theorists espouse two intertwined justifications for euthanasia.
They label these rationales as the right to privacy and the right to selfdetermination. Both of these concepts originally evolved from a belief in
personal autonomy. Rights theorists perceive a zone surrounding each
individual where that individual is supreme and into which the government
may not intrude. Of course, merely enunciating such an expansive principle
is fruitless unless it can be supported by logic and circumscribed by
reasonable limits. Rights theorists have advanced various supporting
premises.
Ronald Dworkin, for example, perceives autonomy as hinging upon the
obligation of government to treat individuals with equal concern and
respect.17 His beliefs, by his own account, represent a liberal perspective.
Dworkin justifies his support for individual freedom by rejecting the
appropriateness of universal notions of "right-living." He states that by
interfering with self-determination and preventing personal choice, the
18
government itself must choose between various concepts of the good life.
Dworkin argues that allowing the majority to impose its concept of the good
life upon the rest of society tramples the rights of those who do not share the
majority's conviction. Naturally, he responds that statements, such as, "We
are acting in the individual's best interests," are paternalistic and derive from
the unwarranted conclusion that government can determine an individual's
needs more effectively than the individual. 9 Dworkin opts for a series of
strong civil rights that would protect personal preferences.20
By contrast, Robert Nozick, a libertarian, bases his theory of individualism on the primacy of liberty and contractual rights. 21 Nozick, like
Dworkin, views majority will as eroding individual autonomy. However,
Nozick construes virtually all political decisionmaking as domination, as the

17. Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 125 (Stuart
Hampshire ed., 1978).
18. Id. at 127.
19. RONALD DwORKiN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 192-93 (1993).
20. Dworkin, supra note 17, at 125.
21. But see Robert C.L. Moffat, "Minimal Government:" An IntroductoryAppraisal, 58
PERSONALIST 321, 329 (1978) (disputing Nozick's concept of absolute rights and criticizing
Nozick's view of the law as negative sanction). See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE AND UTOPIA (1974) (proposing a minimal "night watchman" state that only fulfills
certain core state functions).
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His utilitarian viewpoint is devoid of any real

Instead, his theory revolves around the
analysis of human nature.23
acquisitive propensity of individuals and historic entitlements to property
rights.' Nozick only takes into account only what he sees as the rational
self-interest of individual members of the community.25 He studiously
avoids the idea of a collective good and, like Dworkin, refuses to articulate
any concept of the good life.
Both Dworkin and Nozick successfully point out that majority rule often
subsumes individual autonomy. However, neither philosopher provides a
satisfactory explanation of why autonomy is important to humans.
Autonomy is, in fact, taken as an inherent good. In my mind, this is an
inadequate starting point. A superior rights-based theory would have to
examine the nature of humankind before outlining any absolute rights that it
is presumed to possess. Thus, backwards reasoning and an inadequate
analysis of human nature are distinguishing weaknesses in much rights-based
thought. A realistic portrait of humankind would represent it in all its
complexity. Such a portrayal would need to impart the rich detail of human
character and human existence.
The approach advanced by the symbolic interactionalist school of
sociology and adopted by Professor Lon L. Fuller most convincingly fulfills
this exigency. As Fuller points out, humans are neither stagnant nor solitary,
but dynamic and communicative. 26 Healthy persons seek to become; they
strive, set goals, and value growth and achievement.
The trait of
purposiveness is central to any concept of why autonomy ranks high among
human needs.
In addition, the symbolic interactionalists perceive human character as
greater than the sum of environmental and genetic influences. This idea
clashes with behaviorist notions that humans are the end products of various
formative stimuli. 27 Behaviorists, such as B.F. Skinner and his disciples,

22. Moffat, supra note 2 1, at 327-28.
23. Id. at 323-24.
24. NOZICK, supra note 21, at 150-55.
25. See id. at 16-17 (summarizing an "invisible hand" development of the minimal state).
"Out of anarchy, pressed by spontaneous groupings ... and rational self-interest there arises

something very much resembling a minimal state ..

Id.

26. FULLER, supra note 12, at 11.
27. See generally B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1953) (explaining the

"scientific validity" of behaviorist theory). But see Robert C.L. Moffat, The Indispensable
Role of IndependentEthicalJudgment, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 477,481 (1969) (refuting Skinner's
logic).
[B]ehaviorism not only assumes the invalidity of but explicitly rejects traditional
human concepts such as freedom, responsibility, and purpose. The classic example
of the theory at work is probably provided by the father of the philosophy, B.F.
Skinner, who in one experiment conditioned a pigeon to play ping-pong. The
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believe that people are located at the focal point of suffocating circles of
social control. All forces, they suppose, act inward upon the individual.2"
In keeping with this model, behaviorists attribute both success and failure to
impetuses found outside the individual actor. The person is seen as a pawn
rather than as an accountable agent. This ideology, not surprisingly, has
evolved into an artifice for relieving guilt and excusing misbehavior. Modem
society readily embraces many behaviorist assumptions and,2 9 as a result,
autonomy has been rendered less meaningful.30
However, I am not
convinced that the game of life is so immutably fixed.
While human development is clearly influenced by external factors,
internal forces also shape personality. Without this evolving psyche,
behavior truly would be mechanical; people could be cast as robotic victims
of their genes and surroundings. Accordingly, Professor Fuller cautions,
"Today a whole complex of attitudes, practices, and theories . . . den[y] that
man is, or can meaningfully strive to become, a responsible, self-determining
center of action."'" Fuller's remark, while aimed at the behaviorists, also
conveys a disturbing image. Should choice and responsibility vanish,
purpose and potential would likewise disappear. At once, we would be
banished to a wretched reality, a reality in which bare survival becomes
paramount. We would be hurled into a vacuum which echoes the emptiness
of behaviorist models of existence.

irreverent thought that may occur to one who considers this instance might be that
while Skinner was saying to himself, "Look how I've made this stupid bird bat the
ball with his beak by giving him food," the pigeon may have been saying to [it]self,
"Look how I've conditioned this guy to give me food by batting that silly ball
around." Nonetheless, if one seriously rejects freedom, responsibility, purpose and
reason, upon what basis may one decide which of the participants in the experiment
is doing the conditioning and which is being conditioned?
Moffat, supra.
28. SKINNER, supra note 27; see also PETER L. BERGER, INVITATION TO SOCIOLOGY: A
HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE 73 (1963) (summarizing a behaviorist assessment of man).
29. See CHARLES J. SYKES, A NATION OF VICTIMS: THE DECAY OF THE AMERICAN
CHARACTER 33-52, 136-47 (1992) (describing the rise of the "therapeutic culture" and the
tendency of psychologists to blame bad behavior on external causes).
In some, (though not all) of its forms psychotherapy is only one of several doctrines
of determinism ... [which] share the conviction that we are the products, rather
than the masters, of circumstance.
Although it has not always done so explicitly, the therapeutic culture tends
to minimize the role of choice and free will .... At its most behavioristicextreme,
this mind-set comes close to abolishing mind altogether ....
If a person is really
a bunch of impulses and traumas, he can be absolved of guilt and responsibility for
his actions.
Id. at 146-47 (emphasis added).
30. Moffat, supra note 27, at 481.
31. FULLER, supra note 12, at 163.
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But, as I suggested earlier, the important aspects of our existence are not
so Pavlovian. Professor Fuller and the symbolic interactionalists show us
that humankind is neither that trivial nor that predictable. Inclinations toward
purpose, choice, and self-realization are omnipresent in human nature. These
attributes and aspirations constitute indispensable components of the entire
person. 2 Reflection and introspection also play crucial roles in making us
who we are. In essence, we are compositions of our own creation.
Therefore, what makes us unique is the ability to remake the self through
deliberation and choice. This capacity to transform the self, to undergo
moral growth, is the essence of human character.33 This is the primary
importance of autonomy, and it also is one of the key insights of the
symbolic interactionalists.
Overall, the need to participate in shaping one's life warrants some
degree of autonomy. Those who support active euthanasia do not, however,
seek an absolute zone of exclusion, as many rights theorists would have us
believe. True, the need for autonomy provides a stirring rationale for
allowing choice. But, without legal constructs providing a framework for
decision, the significance of choice is lost.34 Simply legalizing mercykilling is insufficient because, absent proper oversight, the procedure still
would be capriciously applied. Its borders would remain indistinct. What
advocates of euthanasia really seek is a zone of legally enhanced choice, a
province of empowerment. Government is not an unwelcome guest within
this zone if, rather than erecting barriers, it provides an adequate mechanism
for decision.
B.

ToleratingDiverse Perspectives on Life and Death

Autonomy, notwithstanding its obvious importance, does not comprise
the full scope of individualist rationales for euthanasia. It is buttressed by
the second prong of this analysis, the concept of toleration. While the state
has a duty to protect life, this duty must be tempered by the recognition that
interpretations of life and death differ among individuals. Citizens should
hesitate before permitting the arbitrary will of the lawgiver to trample upon
their personal beliefs. Perhaps the best way to illustrate the need for
toleration is to explore some of these diverse perspectives on life and death.
Some, while earnestly believing in the sanctity of life, view it as little

32. Likewise, if a zone of privacy exists, there is no need to discover it among artificial
penumbras emitted from the Bill of Rights. We can forthrightly derive it from the human trait
of purposiveness and from the psychological need to make personal decisions.
33. Professor Fuller contests the view that survival is the fundamental human aim.
Instead, he sees communication as paramount. FULLER, supra note 12, at 184-86.
34. See Moffat, supra note 21, at 328 (stressing the facilitative nature of social and
political institutions).
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more than a biological function. Radical adherents to this perspective might
hold elaborate funeral services for miscarried fetuses. Similarly, they might
urge that infants born without brains be mechanically maintained until
technology can no longer support the illusion of biological activity. Even
permanently comatose individuals are looked upon as viable members of the
community. Such hapless beings might, in the minds of some, "attend"
various functions, "participate" in a variety of outings, or "join" other family
members at the dinner table. Finally, this outlook countenances making
every effort to extend the life of an elderly cancer patient, even though the
patient has specifically requested cessation of treatment.
Physical life is seen as an absolute good, even if extending it results in
a living hell. Death, in turn, is viewed as something to be spurned and
avoided, no matter how high the emotional or financial toll of continued life.
These concepts are advanced by certain disability activists, the Christian
Defense Coalition, 35 and a scattering of other organizations.36 Certainly,
people are entitled to' hold such beliefs.37 People with such convictions
should be permitted to live in a vegetative or painful state, as long as they
can afford the medical costs. Perhaps these torments are best reserved for
those who would impose such circumstances upon the rest of us.
Needless to say, some of the aforementioned organizations are not
satisfied with trying to circumscribe the behavior of their members. Instead,
they seem compelled to extend their concepts of morality to others.3 s Such

35. Many of these same groups support capital punishment, a practice in which state
interests are presumed to outweigh any interest in preserving the life of the individual
criminal.
36. The Catholic church, while holding more moderate views than the other organizations
mentioned, published a Declarationon Euthanasiain 1980, which reads in part: "Intentionally
causing one's own death, or suicide, is therefore equally as wrong as murder; such an action
on the part of a person is to be considered as a rejection of God's sovereignty and loving
plan." (quoted in Gifford, supra note 2, at 1552). However, the Catholic church also sanctions
the use of pain killing drugs, even if the dosages needed to gain relief eventually shorten the
life of the patient. WENNBERG, supra note 3, at 103-05. This surprisingly liberal stance is
difficult to distinguish from active euthanasia. Although it does not assure death, it does
increase the odds of a premature death. At some point, however, either the drugs or the
disease will surely kill the dying patient.
37. Toleration of a wide variety of beliefs parallels fundamental notions of autonomy and
self-determination. Part of the problem is that many radical and wholly indefensible
ideologies go unchallenged. Reluctant to offend the sensibilities of ideology holders, the law
bends silently in their direction.
38. Fuller alludes to this tendency in THE MORALITY OF LAW when he speaks of an
imaginary pointer on the moral scale that indicates where duty leaves off and aspiration takes
over.
The whole field of moral argument is dominated by a great undeclared war over the
location of this pointer. There are those who struggle to push it upward; others who
work to pull it down. Those whom we regard as being unpleasantly - or at least
inconveniently - moralistic are forever trying to inch the pointer upward so as to
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groups, though, should not be permitted to impose their morals upon the rest
of society.3 9 If perpetuated by the legal system, repeated minority impositions can only breed contempt for the law. With increasing frequency,
doctors and patients are circumventing laws banning assisted suicide.40
Unlike biological preservationists and disability activists, most citizens
hold a balanced view of life and death. Indeed, there are good reasons to
reject the conceptualist notion that all life is equally good while all death is
inherently evil.4 ' We cannot be certain of what awaits us as we cross
death's threshold. Fear of the unknown is only natural. However, when that
fear incapacitates us, rendering us powerless to affect our destiny, then we
have retreated into a defensive posture. We have truly come to accept death
as an end, rather than as a beginning.
Expanding upon this observation, it seems paradoxical that some
religious groups, while committed to the idea of a life hereafter, are fixated
upon the goal of extending life at all costs. In fact, a "premature submission" to death is sometimes viewed as an insult to God and a failure to fully
appreciate God's gift of life.42 According to this ideology, death only
results from an expression of God's will. Thus, God's plan should never be
altered through human intervention.4 3
However, this line of reasoning contains a serious flaw. If shortening life
offends God's plan, artificially extending life through medical technology
should prove equally insulting." Is hooking up a permanently vegetative

expand the area of duty. Instead of inviting us to join them in a pattern of life they
consider worthy of human nature, they try to bludgeon us into a belief we are duty
bound to embrace this pattern. All of us have probably been subjected to some
variation of this technique at one time or another. Too long an exposure to it may
leave in the victim a lifelong distaste for the whole notion of moral duty.
FULLER, supra note 12, at 10 (emphasis added).
39. Julia Pugliese, Note, Don't Ask - Don't Tell: The Secret Practice of PhysicianAssisted Suicide, 44 HASTNGS L.J. 1291, 1309 (1993).
40. See generally id. (examining the frequency of physician-assisted suicide and their
underlying reasons).
41. See FULLER, supra note 12, at 18 (praising the idea of balance and moderation, that
is, a just mean). "This notion [of balance] is not so trite as it seems. It is a characteristic of
normal human beings that they pursue a plurality of ends; an obsessive concern for some
single end can in fact be taken as a symptom of mental disease." Id.
42. WENNBERG, supra note 3, at 81.
43. Id. at 64. "To respect the lives of persons is to respect the divine calling that each
person has, for each individual is a participant in a drama, the outcome of which is her moral
or spiritual destiny." Id. (emphasis added).
44. But see id. at 95 (explaining why extending life should not be considered playing
God). "[E]xtending life is usually viewed as furthering God's purposes. In such cases we
become healing instruments through whom the divine will is being executed; far from taking
matters out of God's hands[,] ... we become extensions of his hands." Id. Wennberg's
circular reasoning hardly explains why a doctor's attempt to sustain a patient mechanically,
despite no chance of recovery, is not playing God. In fact, his characterization of doctors as
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patient to a heart-lung machine an expression of God's will?4" Such an
assertion is difficult to defend. This permutation demonstrates the absurdity
of claiming that patients are destined by God's plan to suffer through the
medium of recent technology. Mechanically prolonging life is too frequently
a crime against the original nature of humankind.
Such actions are more properly viewed as examples of human ambition
to thwart the inevitable, to defeat death itself. Notably, what motivates some
doctors to prolong life beyond its natural limits echoes the spirit of Victor
Frankenstein in Mary Shelley's gothic masterpiece.46 Frankenstein gloats,
"[W]hat glory would attend the discovery if I could . . . render man
invulnerable to any but a violent death!, 47 Hence, Frankenstein strove with
"excessive ardor" to prevent "the worm [from inheriting] the wonders of the
eye and brain."48 Eventually, he managed to infuse life into a corpse. But
when the monster opened its "dull yellow eye[,] ... the beauty of the dream
vanished," and Frankenstein, horrified by his creation, abandoned it. 49 He
despised "the existence of the living monument of presumption and rash
ignorance[,]" which he had loosed upon the world."
In other words,
Frankenstein bitterly regretted his attempt to transcend the gulf that separates
humans from the omnipotent.5 ' Although in a sense Frankenstein's monster
lived, it was really death in human form. Sadly, the same can be said of
many intensive care patients and nursing home residents today. Perhaps, the
novel Frankenstein can teach us something about the limits of science. It
also might serve to remind us of the appalling results that so often attend
unbridled assaults upon death.
Religious denominations and doctors are not the only groups that look
toward death with foreboding. Our society, through the media, tends to
project an ominous image of death. Even commentators who favor
euthanasia oftentimes suffer from this proclivity. Dworkin laments, "Death's
central horror is oblivion - the terrifying, absolute dying of the light."

"extensions of God's hands," saddles his analysis with precisely the charge he is attempting
to fend off.
45.

BARBARA J. LOGUE, LAST RIGHTS: DEATH CONTROL AND THE ELDERLY IN AMERICA

115 (1993) (asking how we can be sure that a patient's kidney failure is not a message from
God that the patient's life is over).
46. MARY W. SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (Signet Classic 1965) (1816).
47. Id. at 40.
48. Id. at 51.
49. Id. at 56.
50. Id. at 76. Indeed, the monster itself echoed these sentiments when it proclaimed,
"Accursed creator! Why did you form a monster so hideous that even you turned from me
in disgust? God, in pity, made man beautiful and alluring ... but my form is a filthy type
of yours, more horrid even from the very resemblance." Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 201. Frankenstein reflects, "I trod heaven in my thoughts, now exulting in my
powers, now burning with the idea of their effects." Id.
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"Death has dominion," he continues, "because it is not only the start of
nothing but the end of everything ....
."" Perhaps, Dworkin's pessimism
is warranted. But, by casting our ideas of death in the image of perpetual
darkness, have we not prematurely rejected the possibility of continuation
that death might offer? I am reminded here of a poem, Time, 3 written by
an uncle who died several years ago.
How do we know when time is "running out"?
Some whispering voice perhaps
or
one final deathly shudder
or
Does some chilling wind announce life's end
yet promise but another?
How do you know my friend
that death ITSELF is not life's brother?
Apart from questioning harsh impressions of death, perhaps our traditional
ideas of life are vulnerable to different interpretations. If we look past mere
biological function and quantity of life, we might come across other
definitions of human life. What I am positing is that quality of life may be
more important than its length. 4 Many consider the potential for selfrealization as one of the chief characteristics of human life. They believe
that when purpose, potential, and choice disappear, human life likewise
55
ceases to exist.

52. DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 199.
53. Thomas H. Boning, Time (1974) (on file with author).
54. One qualitative view of life is advanced by Barbara J. Logue. She distinguishes
biological life from biographical life. To introduce these different concepts, she compares the
practice of birth control, to the practice of euthanasia. She reasons:
If being alive took precedence, parents would not care about how many children
they had; they would not concern themselves with a child's characteristics or its
welfare. But parents do not typically think so narrowly. They want their children
to have a biographical life - to learn, love, and laugh, to work and play, to have
hopes and dreams and see at least some of them fulfilled, to be aware of themselves
as unique individuals, to interact with others, to contribute to their community. To
have a life in the biographical sense obviously requires life in the biological sense,
but the reverse is not equally true .... [I]f one's biographical life is over (if one
is permanently unconscious, for example), there is no point in having a biological
life. Just as there is no inherent contradiction between love of children and desire
for reproductive control[,] ...there is no necessary inconsistency between love of
life and a desire to end it.
LOGUE, supra note 45, at 4.

55. We also might question whether all life is equally worthy of preservation.
however, is a topic requiring a separate analysis.

This,
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The significance of quality of life cannot be overstated. The story of a
Florida teenager, whose choice to forego treatment received national publicity
in 1994, provides powerful support for this sentiment. His story deserves
retelling. Benny Agrelo underwent two liver transplants at the ages of eight
and thirteen. 6 By age fifteen, his second donor-liver was failing. 7
Predictably, the doctors resolved to continue a three-times-a-day drug
regimen until they could locate a third donor-liver. Benny, however, decided
he had endured enough. He declined further treatment and stopped taking
the anti-rejection medication. 8 His decision was not surprising, considering
he had been in and out of hospitals ever since he was an infant and had
suffered years of debilitating headaches as a side effect of his medication. 9
Benny's doctors, appalled by the young man's intransigence, pressured
him to resume treatment. 60 Benny steadfastly refused. Of course, not every
fifteen-year-old is sufficiently mature to rationally make such a decision, but
Benny demonstrated remarkable wisdom. 6' "When a person does not want
treatment, doctors should leave him alone.., and for such a little chance [of
surviving] it would not be worth it," he explained .6 2 Realistically, even if
Benny had endured a third transplant, he probably would not have survived
to adulthood.63 Benny also observed that the donated liver could help save

56. Amy Driscoll, HRS Admits Error in Handling Ill Teen, "No Need to Use Force,"
Chief Says, MIAMI HERALD, June 14, 1994, at IA.
57. Id.
58. Id.

59. Other side effects included painful joints, vomiting, and exhaustion. Id. Although
he "devoured nature stories and Dungeons and Dragons," he was frustrated by his inability
to read. Carol J. Castaneda, Ill Teen Rejects Medicationfor "Best Months Of My Life, " USA

June 13, 1994, at 6A (final ed.).
60. Driscoll, supra note 56, at IA.
Doctors have not given up hope that Benny will rethink his decision. Dr. Andreas
G. Tzakis... director of the liver transplant division at Jackson Memorial Hospital,

TODAY,

said he has tried to persuade the boy to continue treatment .

. .

. If Benny had

consulted doctors before abandoning his medicine, they might have been able to
give him an alternative Tzakis said.
Id.

The obsession some doctors have with preserving life, while neglecting of other aspects
of treatment. TIMOTHY QUILL, M.D., DEATH AND DIGNITY: MAKING CHOICES AND TAKING
CHARGE 49, 57-60 (1993). "I believe that most physicians tend to understate the potential
adverse consequences of medical interventions. . . . In medical training and practice, the
prolongation of life is given a much higher value than the lessening of human suffering ..
Id. at 49.
61. Amy Driscoll, 15-Year-Old TransplantPatient Tells His Story Tonight on TV, MIAMI

July 7, 1994, at 7. Reporter John Quinones, who interviewed Benny, stated, "Benny
is very spunky, articulate, mature. We were very impressed with his ability to make this
decision." Id.
62. Benny's Choice, USA TODAY, June 14, 1994, at 12A (final ed.).
HERALD,

63. Id.
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someone else's life. 64 "I don't want to die," Benny conceded. But
continued, "I'm tired of living in pain. I'd rather stay at home and live as
close as I can to a normal life. 65 Benny's family concurred with his
decision.'
Regrettably, the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services, at the insistence of Benny's doctors, ignored Benny's wishes and
decided to "rescue" him. 67 The agency obtained a detention order. Shortly
thereafter, police, social workers, and a bevy of twirling lights greeted the
Agrelo family at their front door.6' Even though Benny struggled and
screamed, police forcibly removed him from his home, strapped him to a
medical gurney,69 and wheeled him to a waiting ambulance.70 Benny was
incarcerated in the hospital where doctors repeatedly tried to convince him
to take anti-rejection medication.7 Fortunately, the law quickly intervened
to defeat this poorly-conceived scheme.72 After an emergency hearing and
after interviewing Benny, Circuit Judge Arthur Birken threw out the detention
order.73
Benny then returned home and spent the summer relaxing in his
backyard, playing video games, and watching his pet fish.74 Without the
drug's painful side effects, Benny said he enjoyed "the best months of [his]
life," and so, he felt "it was worth it."75 Perhaps most significantly, Benny
briefly escaped the medicalization of his life.76 He did not die in a hospital
entangled in a cascade of tubes and wires. Instead, Benny died at home
surrounded by his family. In his final moments, he awoke, raised his arms,
and asked his mother for a hug.77 Benny smiled, dying in his mother's
embrace.7"

64. PrimeTime Live, (ABC television broadcast, July 7, 1994).
65. Benny's Choice, supra note 62, at 21 A.
66. Driscoll, supra note 56, at IA.
67. Id.
68. Judge Grants Quality-of-Life Wish to Teen Liver Recipient, STAR TRIBUNE, June 12,
1994, at 4A.
69. Driscoll, supra note 56, at IA.
70. Id.
71. Castaneda, supra note 59, at 6A.
72. Jim Towey, Secretary of the Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, later
apologized to the Agrelo family. Driscoll, supra note 56, at IA. "Benny received the apology
with little more than a shrug. 'I'm tired of being bugged,' he declared." Id.
73. John D. McKinnon, PrivacyLaw Helped DecideIll Boy's Case, MIAMI HERALD, June
15, 1994, at 5B.
74. Prime Time Live (ABC television broadcast, July 7, 1994).
75. Castaneda, supra note 59, at 6A.
76. Gary Fields, Services For Right-To-Die Teen Tuesday, USA TODAY, Aug. 22, 1994,
at IA.
77. Id.
78. Boy Who Refused Medication Dies, GAINESVILLE SUN, Aug. 21, 1994.
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Benny Agrelo left us with an enduring vision of what it means to lead
a quality life. Due to his courage, he found peace through a dignified death.
Personal perspectives such as Benny's should be recognized and tolerated by
society. Such views should not be overridden by the paternalistic impulses
of state agencies or by the brute force of majority politics.79 The need for
toleration, as well as the need for autonomy, comprise the core individualist
justifications for euthanasia.
In summary, meaningful existence depends upon the ability to make
meaningful choices. The decision to bring one's life to a close ranks among
the most important of human choices. Whether euthanasia is chosen to avoid
pain or to avoid the effects of a debilitating injury, such choices belong to
the individual, not to the state. The designation of the government as the
ultimate arbiter of individual destiny must surely offend any school of
thought that values freedom. Assisted suicide, when stripped to its essence,
is the final exercise of control when no further choices remain. As such, it
should be viewed with compassionate understanding.
IV. SOCIETAL RATIONALES FOR EUTHANASIA
Most decisions in right-to-die cases, share one peculiarity. Courts often
describe the state's only interest as the preservation of life. 0 In Cruzan v.
Director of the Missouri Department of Health, for example, Justice
Rehnquist reiterated, "[A] State may also properly decline to make judgments
about the 'quality' of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply
assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed
against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual.'
But
contrary to the language in Cruzan, the state has a number of interests in
right-to-die cases, other than the preservation of life. In keeping with this
observation, there have been some notable exceptions to the standard
preservation of life incantation.
Two recent federal district court decisions have taken a less rigid view
of state interests and a more expansive view of the individual's interests. In
Compassion in Dying v. State,8 2 an eight-to-three majority of the U.S. Court

79. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). "At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State." Id.
80. Courts occasionally mention other state interests such as the prevention of suicide,
which is essentially the same as the preservation of life; the protection of incompetents, which
also concerns the preservation of life; and preservation of the integrity of the medical
profession. Oddi, supra note 8, at 632.
81. 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) (emphasis added).
82. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. grantedsub nom. Washington v. Glucksburg,
117 S.Ct. 37 (1996).
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of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck part of a Washington statute that
prohibited aiding suicide. 3 For the first time ever, a federal appellate court
acknowledged a fundamental liberty interest in the right to die. 4 The
majority performed a substantive due process analysis, balancing the patients'
liberty interests against various state interests. It reasoned that the state's
86
interest in preserving life subsides as the patient's condition deteriorates.
The court admonished, "Not only is the state's interest in preventing such
individuals from hastening their deaths of comparatively iittle weight but its
insistence on frustrating their wishes seems cruel indeed. 8 7 The court
concluded:
[By] permitting the individual to exercise the right to choose we are
following the constitutional mandate to take such decisions out of the
hands of the government, both state and federal, and to put them
where they rightly belong, in the hands of the people. We are
allowing individuals to make the decisions that so profoundly affect
their very existence - and precluding the state from intruding
excessively into that critical realm. 8
In Quill, MD. v. Vacco,"9 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit took a less dramatic approach. It used an equal protection analysis
to invalidate parts of two New York statutes that prohibited assisted
suicide. 90 According to the court, the statutes failed to accord equal
treatment to similarly situated people. 9 They permitted certain patients to

83. Id. at 794. The statute, RCW 9A.36.060, provided, "A person is guilty of promoting
a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide." Id.
(emphasis added). The court determined that the words "or aids" violated the substantive due
process rights of terminal patients.
84. Id. at 813-16.
85. The Court in Compassion in Dying identified six state interests that could be damaged
by permitting voluntary euthanasia: (1) the preservation of life, (2) the prevention of suicide,
(3) the elimination of undue influence, (4) the protection of the integrity of the medical
profession, (5) the protection of dependents, and (6) the prevention of negative effects caused
by declaring state law unconstitutional. Id. at 816-17.
86. Id. at 819. "When patients are no longer able to pursue liberty or happiness and do
not wish to pursue life, the state's interest in forcing them to remain alive is clearly less
compelling . . . . [T]he strength of the state's interest is substantially reduced in such
circumstances." Id.
87. Id. at 821.
88. Id. at 839.
89. 80 F.3d 716 (2nd Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996).
90. Unlike the court in Compassion in Dying, the court in Quill specifically refused to
find any due process liberty right related to assisted suicide. It stated that "the right contended
for here cannot be considered so implicit in our understanding of ordered liberty that neither
justice nor liberty would exist if it were sacrificed." Id. at 724.
91. Id. at 729.
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hasten death by ordering the removal of life support systems, yet prevented
others who were not on life support from accelerating death.92 The court
noted that the state failed to enunciate a rational reason for distinguishing
between these two classes of patients. 93 The court asked, "[W]hat interest
can the state possibly have in requiring the prolongation of a life that is all
but ended? . . And what business is it of the state to require the continuation of agony when the result is imminent and inevitable? '94 The answer,
95
it determined, was "none."
The courts in Compassion in Dying and Quill reached similar conclusions
through dissimilar reasoning. However, neither court fully explored the
myriad of societal concerns supporting active euthanasia. In fact, the state
has at least three substantial interests in legalizing active euthanasia.
First, the state has an obligation to ensure that members of society are
not unnecessarily forced to suffer unbearable pain or endure an intolerable
existence. Unquestionably, methods other than euthanasia, such'as effective
pain management, might ease the dying process.96 Doctors should never
overlook these alternatives. But if a mission of government is to enable
citizens to achieve self-realization, then clearly this objective is undercut by
refusing to allow them to make their own decisions about their death.
Perpetuating the existence of people in tortuous circumstances serves
absolutely no legitimate government function.97 Therefore, compassion
dictates that the state permit individuals to obtain the means by which they
can die a dignified and relatively painless death.
Second, in a more pragmatic vein, the state has considerable economic
interests at stake. Euthanasia must be examined in light of the current health
care crisis. Care of the terminally ill places an enormous strain on health
care providers, insurers, and families. 98 In the past, costs were not considered, and all possible measures were taken to keep patients alive. 99 This
disregard for costs stemmed from the ability of insurance to mask expendi92. Id.

93. Id. at 730-31.
94. Id. at 729-30.
95. Id.
96. Unfortunately, pain management is frequently ineffective. See Quill, 80 F.3d at 720
(quoting a declaration made by Jane Doe, a cancer patient).
I take a variety of medications to manage the pain .... It is not possible for me to
reduce my pain to an acceptable level of comfort and to retain an alert state. . . . At
the point at which I can no longer endure the pain and suffering associated with my
cancer, I want to have drugs available for the purpose of hastening my death in a
humane and certain manner.
Id.
97. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 821.
98. Schanker, supra note 15, at 1004-05.
99. Id. at 1004.
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tures. I 0 Today, however, with insurance rates skyrocketing, the financial
well-being of health providers and insurance companies depends upon
controlling such costs. 1
In addition, the wealth of families, the culmination of years of hard work,
risk, and saving, is often wiped out during a final illness. 0 2 Meaningful
extensions of life often cannot be purchased at any price, despite such
injurious expenditures. 0 3 The frail elderly, in particular, are most unlikely
to benefit from invasive treatments once they have been stricken with
terminal illness." ° Even in cases where the body can be sustained through
mechanical means, it is often not life that is prolonged, but as the court in
Compassion in Dying suggested, the process of dying.'0 5 Medical resources are finite, and the aggressive treatment of patients who have virtually no
chance of recovery is highly wasteful. Vast outlays are irretrievably
squandered. However, under current law terminal patients are not permitted
to waive their right to live.1 6 Even though they may choose to forego lifesustaining treatment, doctors must still devote extensive resources to
controlling their pain and monitoring their condition.
Finally, the state has an interest in avoiding disrespect for the law.
Existing law is currently being ignored. Physicians are surreptitiously aiding
patients to die, and by most accounts, this practice is being carried out on a
massive scale. 7 Surveys indicate that as many as forty percent of doctors

100. ld. at 1005.
101. Id. "The financial survival of health care institutions now depends directly on
controlling costs generated by individual patient care decisions." Id. (paraphrasing from a
report by the OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INSTITUTIONAL
PROTOCOLS FOR DECISIONS ABOUT LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENTS 4 (1988)).
102. LOGUE, supra note 45, at 132-33; see also Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 826.
Faced with the prospect of astronomical medical bills, terminally ill patients might
decide that it is better for them to die before their health care expenses consume the
life savings they planned to leave for their families, or, worse yet, burden their
families with debts they may never by able to satisfy.
Id.
103. Donald J. Murphy & David B. Matchar, Life-Sustaining Therapy: A Model For
Appropriate Use, 264 JAMA 2103-08 (Oct. 31, 1990).
104. Id.; see also Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 812 (describing the drawn-out nature
of many infirmities suffered by older U.S. citizens).
105. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1464 (W.D.Wash.
1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'd, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
grantedsub nom. Washington v. Glucksburg, 117 S.Ct. 37 (1996).
106. But see Fuller, supra note 12, at 81 (including the congruence between official action
and the declared rule among the eight principles of legality). See generally Pugliese, supra
note 39 (observing the growing trend among physicians to ignore laws against assisted
suicide).
107. Dr. Joanne Lynn, an expert on issues of aging, responded to the complex question,
"What is futility?" She cautioned, "Merely delaying the date on a tombstone is not what we
are trying to do . . . . [Older patients will] never have the chance to say good-by on a
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have indirectly accelerated death.'08 This secretive process carries with it
many risks that could be eliminated by pro-euthanasia legislation.' 0 9 One
major problem is the randomness of current decisionmaking." 0 If the
euthanasia process were legalized, physicians would no longer be forced to
act without consulting psychologists or other doctors about the rationality of
a patient's decision."
While self-help groups, such as the Hemlock society, and books, such as
Final Exit,"2 broaden the options available to those seeking a dignified
death, they also draw attention to an additional danger spawned by current
law, that is, botched suicide attempts. Unsuccessful suicide attempts can
leave people in a worse condition than that from which they were trying to
escape." 3 Gunshot wounds, failed suffocations with plastic bags, and brain
damage resulting from underdoses of potentially lethal drugs are part of the
legacy of criminalized euthanasia." 4 If active euthanasia were legal,
medical supervision could eliminate these tragic consequences.
What is more, those assisting in the suicide of a loved one and doctors
who aid a patient wishing to die should not be exposed to criminal sanction.
Society derives no benefit from branding them as criminals. Although jury
nullification and failure to prosecute make euthanasia somewhat less risky,
it still remains punishable by severe penalties." 5 Most states specifically
categorize assisting with a suicide as a crime." 6 Other states prosecute it
under a variety of statutes. The crusade mounted against those who assist in
suicide rests upon a weak legal foundation because, as mentioned previously,
no state categorizes suicide itself as a crime.' '7 That the current level of

ventilator." Nightline: Life at any Cost (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 28, 1994).
108. Pugliese, supra note 39, at 1305 n. 111,
1306 n. 113. (describing the results of several
physician surveys).
109. Cf FULLER, supra note 12, at 81 (listing congruence between official action and the
declared rule among the principles of legality).
110. Pugliese, supra note 39, at 1306.
111. Id.
112. DEREK HUMPHRY, FINAL EXIT: THE PRACTICALITIES OF SELF-DELIVERANCE AND

ASSISTED SUICIDE FOR THE DYING (1991). But see QUILL, supra note 60, at 126-28 (arguing
that Final Exit is an oversimplified treatment, with few safeguards and an insufficient
exploration of the moral issues involved).
113. Pugliese, supra note 39, at 1307-1308.
114. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 832. "Miscalculation can be tragic. It can lead to
an even more painful and lingering death." Id.
115. Pugliese, supra note 39, at 1299 n.49 (listing legal outcomes in various cases of
assisted suicide).
116. Robert A. Pletcher, Assisted Suicidefor the Terminally-Ill: The Inadequacyof Current
Legal Models to RationallyAnalyze Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 13 CRIM. JUST. J.303, 305
(1992).
117. See Risley, supra note 7, at 365.
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stigma should attach to an act of benevolence seems ludicrous."'
Overall, three state interests - alleviating the suffering of citizens,
eliminating economic waste, and avoiding disrespect for the law - provide
firm societal rationales for permitting active euthanasia. Courts, therefore,
should balance the state's interest in preserving life, not only against
individual liberty interests, but also against the diverse interests enumerated
above. The scales of justice will remain weighted against those seeking
finality, if courts continue to employ an incomplete analytical framework.
V.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST EUTHANASIA

Opponents of active euthanasia assail the above justifications on four
fronts not previously mentioned. First, they urge that the practice of
euthanasia lends itself to abuse. Second, they worry that a miracle cure
might be discovered just after life has been extinguished. Third, they profess
concern that euthanasia would function as "the thin end of the wedge,"
inevitably leading to involuntary euthanasia and a general disrespect for life.
Finally, some euthanasia foes charge that euthanasia violates the Sixth
Commandment's prohibition on taking life.
Contrary to the first assertion, the practice of legalized euthanasia is not
particularly susceptible to abuse. Obviously, the original purpose of any
institution can be subverted and corrupted. However, as indicated earlier
mistakes would be less prevalent within a rule-based framework than within
what is currently the secret and unregulated practice of euthanasia." 9
Perhaps of greater concern, is the possibility that patients might become
susceptible to coercion by families, benefactors, and health care workers. 2 '
Those in poor physical condition may prove more vulnerable to subtle
manipulation than those in good health.'
One commentator who opposes
providing euthanasia for the physically handicapped contends, "We believe

118. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 836.
Some terminally ill persons enlist their children, parents, or others who care for
them deeply in an agonizing, brutal and damaging endeavor, criminalized by the
state, to end their pain and suffering. The loving and dedicated persons who agree
to help - even if they are fortunate enough to escape prosecution - will likely
suffer pain and guilt for the rest of their lives. Those who decline to assist may
always wonder whether they should have tried to save their parent or mate from
enduring unnecessary and protracted agony.

Id.
119. Id. at 832-33. "State laws or regulations governing physician-assisted suicide are both
necessary and desirable to ensure against errors and abuse, and to protect legitimate state
interests." Id.
120. Shanker, supra note 15, at 982.
121. But see Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 825-26 (suggesting that any risk of undue
influence is minimal).

100
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that in any remotely similar situation we would want to end our own lives.
And we project these beliefs of ours onto mentally alert physically disabled
people. 122 Moreover, the indigent and uninsured may find themselves
particularly pressured by health care institutions to forego treatment. The
financial incentives for this type of abuse may be present in any program of
active euthanasia.
However, upon closer scrutiny, this line of reasoning proves largely
illusory. No personal decisions are made in a vacuum. 123 Effective choice
can only be made if the decisionmaker is well-informed. It is only natural
for someone contemplating suicide to seek the advice of doctors, family
members, and friends. Such influence is at worst permissible and in most
cases desirable. Distrust of the ability of the decisionmaker to make a
rational decision is the most common excuse given when outsiders attempt
to usurp the right to decide. Therefore, statements that profess a belief that
patients are incapable of making balanced decisions, merely inform us that
should be
the speaker is making a transparent grab for power. The choice
24
coercion.'
serious
undergone
has
invalidated only if a patient
In addition, euthanasia opponents often observe that it is impossible to
exclude emotional and financial concerns from the patient's final decision.125 They express fear that severe pain might distort the reasoning

122. Mary Johnson, Voluntary Active Euthanasia: The Next Frontier?,8 ISSUES L. & MED.
343, 348 (1992). In this note, Johnson contends that the only reason severely handicapped
persons would consider suicide is because society fails to provide them with sufficient
technology and services (read money) which would enable them to live a "normal" life. Also,
she argues that handicapped persons suffer from low self esteem because society reinforces
their feelings of dependency. Such a view is disturbing in several respects. First, it disregards
means while promoting unrealistic ends. Second, her argument denigrates the emotions and
intellect of the physically handicapped. It is, in my estimation, contrary to the interests of the
physically challenged to suggest that they are incapable of making an informed decision.
123. Gifford, supra note 2, at 1560.
124. Id. at 1563. "It is natural for a person to consider the effects that his life or death will
have on those around him. The important task is to determine where ordinary influence ends
and impermissible coercion begins." Id.
125. See Yale Kamisar, Euthanasia Legislation: Some Non-Religious Objections, in
EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DEATH

93-95 (A. B. Downing ed., 1969) [hereinafter

Kamisar, EuthanasiaLegislation] (arguing that various circumstances negate the ability of patients to make rational decisions). In a separate work, Professor Yale Kamisar states that with
proper medication and pain management there would be little need to resort to active euthanasia. Yale Kamisar, Active v. Passive Euthanasia:Why Keep the Distinction?,TRIAL, Mar.
1993, at 36-37 [hereinafter Kamisar, Active v. Passive Euthanasia]. This is a specious
argument. Professor Kamisar is advancing an "if' proposition as an existent factual
circumstance. If the pain were always adequately controlled, then Kamisar's argument might
not be irrelevant in all cases. QUILL, supra note 60, at 23. "[E]nd of life suffering is not
exclusively a problem of access to good palliative care. Unfortunately, some patients still
experience anguishing deaths in spite of heroic efforts by skilled physicians, nurses, and
family members." Id.
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process.26 This seems a callous argument. 1 7 External observers should
not presume to dictate which factors should weigh into this most personal of
decisions. Do they suggest that patients must approach their impending death
scientifically and that the individual's feelings are of no account? If so, this
is a most disturbing extension of positivist methodology. 8
One commentator asks, "Will not some feel an obligation to have
themselves 'eliminated' in order that funds allocated for their terminal care
might be better used by their families or, financial worries aside, in order to
relieve their families of the emotional strain involved?"'' 29 My response to
this question is simple. Why shouldn't such concerns enter into the
decision? 3 ' That a person should be rational and sane when approaching
such a momentous choice can hardly be disputed. But rationality does not
Rationality
require the exclusion of concern for other family members.'
does not depend upon the elimination of emotion or the absence of pain. To
suggest that persons are free to choose so long as they do not make
erroneous or emotional choices precludes any significant liberty. While the
practice of euthanasia obviously requires close regulation, much of the
envisioned potential for abuse is based on false premises.
Besides expressing concerns over abuse, some euthanasia opponents
worry that a miracle cure might be discovered shortly after euthanasia has
been administered. However, the Food and Drug Administration does not
approve new medical techniques overnight, therefore, doctors would
undoubtedly be aware of any revolutionary treatments on the horizon. More
importantly, only one person, the patient, knows the magnitude of distress
thus far experienced. Only the patient has sufficient moral clout to weigh the
126. Kamisar, EuthanasiaLegislation, supra note 125, at 95. But see Gifford, supra note
2, at 1559 (countering Kamisar's 'pain distortion' arguments).
127. Kamisar, at one point, denigrates the validity of any patient's desire to exit life. "That
of those who do suffer and must necessarily suffer the requisite pain, many really desire death,
I have considerable doubt. Further, that of those who may desire death at a given moment,
many have a fixed and rational desire for death, I likewise have considerable doubt." Yale
Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN
L. REv. 969, 1011 (1958). But see QUILL, supra note 59, at 20-21 (deriding such impersonal
assessments). "Consideration of the issue by medical ethicists tended to be abstract and
intellectual, minimizing the anguish faced by many dying patients and their families." Id.
128. See Robert C. L. Moffat, The Perils of Positivism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 295,
297, 300, 312 (explaining the inability of positivist methodology to cope with human emotion
and pointing out the dangers of abstracting complex human reality into models and concrete
structure).
129. Kamisar, EuthanasiaLegislation, supra note 125, at 95-96.
130. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 826; see also LOGUE, supra note 45, at 134-36, 13850 (discussing the formidable emotional burdens faced by families when providing care to a
frail elder).
131. Gifford, supra note 2, at 1560. "Kamisar's logic, however, would suggest that the
only decisions truly worthy of respect are the products of a mind that is tabula rasa, entirely
unaffected by the realities of daily existence." Id.
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chances of recovery against the anguish of protracted suffering.
I previously characterized the third argument against euthanasia as the
thin end of the wedge. Critics employing this approach insist that the
practice of euthanasia will lead to a devaluation of the sanctity of life. They
contend that if euthanasia is offered to the dying, it will inevitably be
extended to the severely handicapped, criminals, the insane, or any group that
falls into disrepute. 32 The holocaust in Nazi Germany is most often cited
as an example of how such a scheme could evolve to eliminate the
disfavored. 133 Certainly, this envisioned expansion of euthanasia is a
frightening prospect, but conditions in this country are far different than those
in Nazi Germany. 134 Constitutional restraints and democratic checks would
never permit health care providers to extend euthanasia to involuntary
subjects.
In order to gain a better understanding of whether euthanasia can be
restricted, perhaps we should examine analogous practices that presently are
legal. For example, let us look at abortion.1 35 The thin end of the wedge
argument would suggest that the practice of abortion must inevitably lead to
the killing of healthy but unwanted newborns. 136 Or let us examine the
death penalty. The wedge argument would indicate that the death penalty
must soon be turned into a device for eradicating the indigent and insane.
However, opponents of abortion and opponents of the death penalty, while
often at opposite ends of the political spectrum, must agree on one thing.
They must admit that such expansion is highly improbable. If anything,
these two practices have become more circumscribed, and their boundaries
have become more distinct over time. Through this comparison, the thin end
of the wedge argument is revealed as little more than a scare tactic by the
opponents of euthanasia. Remember that the patient, not the physician,
initiates the euthanasia process. By requiring that decisions stem from
rational choice, the state can eliminate any danger of losing control of the
process. 137
Rather than leading to a devaluation of life, legalized euthanasia would
enhance appreciation for life. By attempting to disguise those decisions
which surround death, society has created an unnatural fear of death. Yet,

132. Kamisar, supra note 127, at 1030-41.
133. Marvin Kohl, Altruistic Humanism and Voluntary Beneficent Euthanasia,8 ISSUEs L.
& MED. 331, 339 (1992).
134. Id. at 339-40; Gifford, supra note 2, at 1568-72.
135. Gifford, supra note 2, at 1551-54.
136. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 830-31 (noting that opponents of abortion used
the thin end of the wedge argument to suggest that abortion would eventually be used as a
form of "racial genocide").
137. Id. at 832. "[W]e view the critical line in the right-to-die cases as the one between
voluntary and involuntary termination of an individual's life." Id.
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as suggested earlier, death is part of the life process. Bringing death out of
the shadows also will encourage a renewed recognition that life on earth is
finite, that whatever is to be accomplished must be accomplished within a
limited window of time. Permitting active euthanasia also may result in
increased sensitivity to the plight of those whose existence is more painful
than pleasurable. Accordingly, euthanasia can be confined and will not erode
societal respect for the sanctity of life.
Finally, the fourth argument against active euthanasia is that it violates
the Sixth Commandment's prohibition, "Thou shalt not kill."' 38 If construed literally, this scripture could be read as an absolute ban against suicide
or assisted suicide. 3 9 Literalists, however, should pause before adopting
such a broad interpretation. When read in such manner, the decree cannot
be isolated to cases of suicide and murder. It would also condemn selfdefense killings, the death penalty, and war. For that matter, a literal reading
would forbid the killing of all animals. A more convincing interpretation of
the Sixth Commandment
might be: "Thou shalt not wrongfully kill another
140
human being."'
Regardless of how one chooses to interpret the Sixth Commandment, two
overriding factors warrant excluding Sixth Commandment concerns from the
euthanasia debate. First, those whose religious beliefs are offended by
narrow interpretations of the Sixth Commandment can forego the euthanasia
option.' 4 ' Second, our legal system need not accurately reflect biblical
pronouncements. After all, a constitutional partition separates church and
state. We live in a society of multiple religions,
many of which owe no
142
particular allegiance to the Ten Commandments.
Of course, not all euthanasia opponents adhere to literal readings of the
Sixth Commandment. Some who favor passive euthanasia, that is, the
discontinuation of medical treatment, continue to object to active euthanasia.
At first glance, a significant difference seems to distinguish passive

138. The Bible does not condemn suicide, even though the Old Testament does mention
four cases of suicide. WENNBERG, supra note 3, at 45, 47.
139. It seems more likely that the Sixth Commandment imposes duties owed toward others.
140. It is inconsistent to hold a pro-choice position on abortion, while opposing active
euthanasia. In effect, this stance would permit extinguishing life at the beginning of life's
spectrum, while prohibiting a dignified exit at the end. A fetus presumably has the potential
to develop and grow. Terminal patients have no such future. Those who hold a pro-life position, however, need not automatically reject euthanasia. Abortion opponents express concern
over the fact that the fetus has no say in its continued existence. They contend that there are
two lives at issue, that of the mother and that of the fetus. With euthanasia, however, there
is only one life at issue and the person involved is in a position to choose, unlike the fetus.
141. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 838; see also id. at 830 (observing that under a
program of voluntary euthanasia, physicians would not be required to do anything contrary
to their individual beliefs).
142. Gifford, supra note 2, at 1553.
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euthanasia from active euthanasia. Active euthanasia, critics point out,
contemplates the initiation of a fatal sequence.143 But this observation
misses the point.
In cases of passive euthanasia, the doctor or the aid-giver is not
responsible for setting the fatal sequence in motion." Rather, the patient
initiates the dying process when he or she waives the right to continued
life.'45 In any case, the removal of life sustaining machinery, which the
law permits, is an affirmative act and will result in death just as certainly as
the administration of a lethal drug."4 The difference between unhooking
a life-support machine and administering a lethal drug is not discernible in
the intent behind the act or in the final outcome. 147 In either case, the
intent is to expedite death, and the final result is death. 48 The real
difference between these two courses of action is that the person who
receives a lethal drug dies peacefully, while the person removed from a lifesupport machine often undergoes a lengthy and demeaning death. The
person removed from the machine may spend the final segment
of life
49
death.
to
starving
slowly
or
pain,
in
writhing
breath,
for
gasping
Thus, after surveying the arguments against active euthanasia, it becomes
apparent that each is significantly flawed. No logic supports the belief that
euthanasia would lend itself to abuse if properly regulated. Additionally,
only the patient is capable of determining whether it is worth waiting for a
miracle cure. Euthanasia simply could not undergo the type of evolution
anticipated by those who advance the thin end of the wedge argument.
Lastly, any perceived violation of the Sixth Commandment is irrelevant in
a nonsectarian democracy. As long as sufficient safeguards are in place, no
logical objection can undermine the use of euthanasia as an alternative to
human suffering.

143. Id. at 1557.
144. Quill, 80 F.3d at 730.
145. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 832. "We consider it less important who administers
the medication than who determines whether the terminally ill person's life shall end." Id.
146. Id. at 822-23.
147. Id. at 824.
[W]e see no ethical or constitutionally cognizable difference between a doctor's
pulling the plug on a respirator and his prescribing pills which will permit a
terminally ill patient to end his own life. In fact, some might argue that pulling the
lug is a more culpable and aggressive act on the doctor's part and provides more
reason for criminal prosecution. To us, what matters most is that the death of the
patient is the intended result as surely in one case as in the other.
Id.

148. LOGUE, supra note 45, at 2. "If behavior is deliberately intended to speed the arrival
of death, and in the absence of the behavior life would continue.
[t]here is nothing
passive about it. " Id.
149. QUILL, supra note 60, at 106-07.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Althougn euthanasia is supported by numerous justifications and would
result in desirable outcomes, no state has instituted a legal framework for
active euthanasia.' 50 Although Oregon Ballot Initiative Sixteen passed by
a narrow margin in November 1994, it is still under review by the
courts.'5 ' It would allow doctors to prescribe lethal pills, but would
prohibit any direct aid for committing suicide to the physically stricken. In
order to benefit from the law, patients would have to consume a sufficient
quantity of the fatal drug. This requirement may deny equal protection to
those unable to swallow such pills.' Still, the Oregon approach represents
a substantial victory for euthanasia proponents. If approved by the courts,
it would offer substantial relief to dying patients.
Attempts to pass more ambitious proposals have met with little
success.' 3 California Proposition 161 and Washington Initiative 119 were
both defeated at the polls. 5 4 Voters turned down these proposals primarily
due to fears over insufficient safeguards.' 5 5 Moreover, in the weeks leading
up to the defeat of the Washington Initiative, Doctor Kevorkian was busy
helping two women die with his "suicide machine."' 5 6 This public spectacle no doubt contributed to voter trepidation.' 57 Notwithstanding these
setbacks, public support for active euthanasia remains high in most
regions.' 58 Hopefully, other states will follow Oregon's lead and pass more
comprehensive legislation. 5 9
Until active euthanasia is permitted by law, individuals can take one

150. Id. at 1546.
151. See Lee v. State of Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D.Or. 1995) (invalidating the Oregon
Death with Dignity Act).
152. Id. at 1438. But see Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 821 (rebuking the district court
for misconstruing a benefit as a burden).
153. Jody B. Gabel, Releasefrom Terminal Suffering?: The Impact of AIDS on Medically
Assisted Suicide Legislation, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 369, 372 (1994).
154. Kamisar, Active v. Passive Euthanasia,supra note 125, at 32-34.
155. See Pugliese, supra note 38, at 1318-22 (detailing the defeat of the two initiatives).
156. While I do not doubt Dr. Kevorkian's sincerity, I am not convinced that he is a fit
spokesperson for the euthanasia movement. He is bound, sooner or later, to make a mistake;
to help extinguish the life of an irrational or easily curable patient. Indeed, Kevorkian's
actions evidence a pressing need for government regulation and legalization of euthanasia.
Regulatory structure is needed to constrain reckless practitioners, ensure principled decisions,
and prevent mishaps. Euthanasia must be legalized so that Kevorkian's endless stream of
"customers" will have other, less primitive options.
157. Kamisar, Active v. Passive Euthanasia,supra note 125, at 32.
158. Id. at 32-33; Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 810; Andrew M. Jacobs, The Right to
Die Movement in Washington: Rhetoric and the Creationof Rights, 36 HOw. L.J. 185, 205-06
(1993).
159. Oregon Ballot Measure 16 passed by a slim majority in November, 1994.
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essential step to reduce the duration of suffering should they confront a
terminal illness. Everyone can fill out an advance directive, more popularly
known as a living will."6 President Nixon's graceful departure from the
realm of the living most vividly illustrated the benefits of an advanced
directive. While such a device provides little solace to the severely
handicapped who do not wish to continue living, it at least
gives dying
16
patients some control over the decisions which affect them. '
In conclusion, active euthanasia is an idea which merits implementation
now. As medical technology advances, the prospect for a protracted and
unnatural death mounts. As the ranks of the frail elderly swell, the volume
of private torture builds to an anguished crescendo.162 Society can and
must provide a humane means for the physically afflicted to end their lives
if they so choose. Civility requires that patients be permitted to retain one
last vestige of their humanity, the ability to choose. To force people to stay
alive against their wishes and to insist that they endure excruciating pain is
the very essence of cruelty. 163 The government, therefore, must allow the

160. Gifford, supra note 2, at 1551.
Today, even in states that have not officially recognized the legal validity of
living wills, federal law requires that every patient admitted to a hospital receiving
federal funds be advised of his right to sign an advance directive indicating his
desire to forego extraordinary life saving measures should something go wrong
during his stay. The law applies to all persons entering such hospitals - whether
for major surgery or for removal of a splinter.
Id.
161. LOGUE, supra note 45, at 85. "An individual who fails to make the necessary hard
choices about foregoing or withdrawing treatment in timely fashion ultimately abrogates them
to others, and this may constitute an unfair imposition on them." Id.
162. Id. at 12-13.
If we define the frail as those who need help with the basic activities of daily life
on a long-term basis, about 6.9 million older Americans fell into the category in
1988, or about one in five of those 65 and over; by 2000, their number is expected
to increase to nearly nine million ....
For many years, we believed that falling
death rates ... meant the population was becoming healthier. Now this confident
assumption is being challenged by evidence that longer life is accompanied by increases in the prevalence of chronic illness and disability.. .. [P]eople seem to be
living longer with, and in spite of, very disabling chronic conditions which the
health care system can "manage," but not cure.
Id.
163.

ROBERT MOFFAT, FIRST,

LIFE AND DEATH 26 (1995)

Do No

HARM: MIXED SIGNALS IN OUR THINKING ABOUT

(discussing the fact that due to the unavailability of active
euthanasia, often, the only course of action for persons seeking death is to refuse nutrition and
hydration).
Suppose that while we were out riding, your horse stumbled, and broke its leg in a
chug hole. I would then sadly but routinely hand you the revolver. As the owner
of the horse, tradition dictates that killing the horse is your honor and responsibility.
But suppose that you said this horse was so special to me that I am going to treat
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choice of active euthanasia for those who suffer intractable pain or
debilitating injury. Failure to permit a dignified exit violates all that was
once good in life and embraces a desolate view of death.

it like a human. I love this horse so much that I am going to starve it to death. We
know the probabilities are very good you would face jail time for animal cruelty on
the grounds that you had acted inhumanely to the horse.
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